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Abstract1 
Drawing from the formal setting of the optimal tax theory (Mirrlees 1971), the paper 
identifies the level of Rawlsianism of some European social planners starting from the 
observation of real data and redistribution systems and uses it to build a metric that allows 
measuring the degree of (dis)similarity of the redistribution systems analyzed. It must be 
considered as a contribution to the comparative research on the structure and typology of the 
Welfare State. In particular we consider the optimal taxation model that combines both 
intensive and extensive margins of labor supply, as suggested by Saez (2002) in order to 
assess the degree of decommodification of seven European welfare systems. We recover the 
shape of the social welfare function implicit in tax-benefit systems by inverting the model on 
actual effective tax rates, as if existing systems were optimal according to some Mirrleesian 
social planner. Actual distributions of incomes before and after redistribution are obtained 
using a pan-European tax-benefit microsimulation model. Results are discussed in the light of 
standard classifications of welfare regimes in Europe. There appears to be a clear coincidence 
of high decommodification willingness and high Rawlsianism in the Scandinavian, social-
democratically influenced welfare states (Denmark). There is an equally clear coincidence of 
low decommodification willingness and utilitarianism in the Anglo–Saxon liberal model (UK) 
and in the Southern European welfare states (Italy and Spain). Finally, the Continental 
European countries (Finland, Germany and France) group closely together in the middle of 
the scale, as corporatist and etatist. 
 
Key Words: Optimal income taxation, tax-benefit policy, microsimulation, comparative social 
policy analysis, welfare state models. 
JEL Classification: H11, H21, D63, C63 
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1 Introduction 
This paper contributes to the debate regarding the typology of welfare states by offering a 
formal theorizing drawing from the optimal taxation literature (Mirrlees 1971) and allowing 
for comparative research on the structure of the Welfare State taking explicitly into account 
the efficiency concerns of the redistribution policies.  
A few years after his publication, the book of Esping Andersen (EA) (1990) “Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism” becomes a modern classic and a reference for any researcher interested 
in the study of the welfare state (Offe, 1991; Cnaan, 1992; Hicks, 1991; Kohl, 1993). The 
main reason of this success was that, for a long time in both the theoretical and empirical 
literature, too little attention had been given to cross-national differences in welfare state 
structures; the book was a clear contribution towards filling this gap2. In his ‘seminal’ book 
EA constructs today’s most frequently used typology of welfare states, and tests empirically 
whether distinct welfare states that resemble his ideal-types can be observed.  
In this literature (see Pestieau 2006), welfare regimes are seen as a complex set of legal and 
organizational features that are systematically interwoven. They are clustered around highly 
diverse regime-types, each organized according to its own logic of organization, stratification, 
and societal integration.  
Four closely paralleled models – ideal-types – of regime-types are commonly referred to. 
Each of them is classified along several criteria including the degree of defamiliarization (i.e. 
the degree to which the market and/or the state  play a role in providing services to 
individuals that were traditionally provided by the family), the level of social stratification 
promoted by social policies and (most important for our purposes) the degree of 
decommodification, i.e. the degree to which a (social) service is rendered (by the state) as a 
matter of right, or, alternatively, the degree to which a person can maintain a livelihood 
without reliance on the (labor) market3. 
First, there is the liberal type of welfare capitalism, which embodies individualism and the 
primacy of the market. The operation of the market is encouraged by the state, either actively 
– subsidizing private welfare schemes – or passively by keeping (often means tested) social 
benefits to a modest level for the demonstrably needy. This welfare regime is characterized by 
a low level of decommodification. The operation of the liberal principle of stratification leads 
to division in the population: on the one hand, a minority of low-income state dependants and, 
on the other hand, a majority of people able to afford private social insurance plans. In this 
type of welfare state, women are encouraged to participate in the labor force, particularly in 
the service sector.  
Second, there is the social-democratic world of welfare capitalism. Here, the level of 
decommodification is high, and the social-democratic principle of stratification is directed 
towards achieving a system of generous universal and highly distributive benefits not 
dependent on any individual contributions. In contrast to the liberal type of welfare states, 
‘this model crowds out the market and, consequently, constructs an essentially universal 
solidarity in favor of the welfare state’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 28). Social policy within this 
type of welfare state is aimed at a maximization of capacities for individual independence. 
Women in particular – regardless of whether they have children or not – are encouraged to 
participate in the labor market, especially in the public sector.  
Third, there is a world of conservative corporatist welfare states, which is typified by a 
moderate level of decommodification. This regime type is shaped by the twin historical 
                                                 
2 Theoretically, the work of Polanyi (1944), Marshall (1950; 1963; 1965; 1981) and Titmuss (1958; 1974) laid 
the foundations for Esping-Andersen’s typology (Boje, 1996). Empirically, some comparative research has been 
conducted, among others, by Wilensky (1975), Flora and Heidenheimer (1981), Mommsen (1981) and Flora 
(1983; 1986). 
3 This definition of decommodification has been elaborated by EA on a previous similar concept of Karl Polanyi 
(1944).  
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legacy of Catholic social policy, on the one side, and corporatism and etatism on the other 
side. This blend had some important consequences in terms of stratification. Labor market 
participation of married women is strongly discouraged, because corporatist regimes – 
influenced by the Church – are committed to the preservation of traditional family structures. 
Another important characteristic of the conservative regime type is the principle of 
subsidiarity: the state will only interfere when the family’s capacity to service its members is 
exhausted (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 27).  
Fourth, there is the Southern European model of social policy (Katrougalos, 1996, Leibfried, 
1992; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Trifiletti, 1999). This class of social protection systems is 
highly fragmented and, although there is no articulated set of minimum social protection, 
some benefits levels are very generous (such as old age pensions). Moreover, in these 
countries health care is institutionalized as a right of citizenship. However, in general, there is 
relatively little state intervention in the welfare sphere (a low level of decommodification). 
Another important feature is the high level of particularism with regards to cash benefits and 
financing, expressed in high levels of clientelism (Ferrera 1996). 
This “standard” classification4 received various types of responses and constructive critiques. 
Amicable critics argue that his typology has merits but is neither exhaustive nor exclusive and 
therefore needs revising. Others refer to theoretical and methodological shortcomings 
(Lessenich and Ostner, 1998). The more hostile critics feel that typologies as such have no 
explanatory power and, therefore, that his scheme does not contribute to proper theorizing 
about what is happening across and within welfare states (Baldwin, 1996). 
In their excellent survey about the debate regarding the typology of welfare states, Arts and 
Gelissen (2002) reconstruct several typologies of welfare states in order to establish, first, 
whether real welfare states are quite similar to others or whether they are rather unique 
specimens, and, second, whether there are three ideal-typical worlds of welfare capitalism or 
more. They conclude that “real welfare states are hardly ever pure types and are usually 
hybrid cases; and that the issue of ideal-typical welfare states cannot be satisfactorily 
answered given the lack of formal theorizing and the still inconclusive outcomes of 
comparative research. In spite of this conclusion there is plenty of reasons to continue to 
work on and with the original or modified typologies”. 
The Arts and Gelissen’ conclusions served as inspiration and motivation of the work we 
report in this paper.  
In what follows, we offer a formal theorizing which draws from the last empirical 
developments of the theory of optimal taxation and, through this new framework, contribute 
to this important debate. 
Optimal taxation has been developed in economics in order to analyze the equity/efficiency 
trade off that a social planner faces when designing one of the pillars of the welfare state: the 
direct redistribution system (i.e. the function that transform individual gross income in 
disposable income). This pillar is, in our view, particularly related to the degree of 
decommodification achieved by a welfare regime.  
We claim that a redistribution system allowing for a high level of subsidies directed to non 
working people implies a high level of decommodification. This claim has an immediate 
consequence: it implies that there is a strong analogy between a social planner aiming to 
“decommodificate” individuals and the degree of Rawlsianism of the social planner in an 
optimal tax model. In his task of determining the best redistribution policy, this Rawlsian 
social planner will guarantee a high level of subsidies directed to the poorest (normally non 
working agent) by charging the financial cost to the richest. Of course, this social planner will 
account for the negative efficiency effects of taxation and also for the initial distribution of the 
                                                 
4 For a complete list see the survey about the debate regarding Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states of 
Arts and Gelissen (2002). 
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economic and socio-demographic characteristics in the population. Assessing the degree of 
Rawlsianism of a redistribution system implies assessing his degree of willingness to 
decommodify citizens and vice versa.  
What we propose here is to use the formal setting of the optimal tax theory to identify the 
level of Rawlsianism of some European social planners starting from the observation of the 
real data and redistribution systems. The results are used to build a metrics that allows us to 
measure the (dis)similarity of the systems analyzed. The proposed setting can be also seen as 
a test of the standard classification.  
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt in that direction. The literature on optimal taxation 
has remained mostly theoretical for a long time following the seminal contributions of 
Mirrlees (1971). The main reason was the absence of reliable information on the `true' 
distribution of individual abilities. In recent years, the use of micro data has allowed 
implementing optimal tax models, under some assumptions about social preferences, in order 
to question the optimality of actual tax-benefit systems. Notably, the U-shaped distribution of 
effective marginal tax rates, often encountered in industrialized countries, has been 
investigated by several authors (Diamond, 1998, Saez, 2001, for the US, Piketty, 1997, 
Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2000, Choné and Laroque, 2005, for France, among others). Of 
particular interest were the conditions under which confiscatory levels of implicit taxation 
could be justified at the bottom of the distribution, or, inversely, how new programs of 
income maintenance could be grounded on the basis of optimal tax formulas. 
A key element in such empirical applications of optimal tax models is the shape of social 
preferences. The curvature of the social welfare function in a continuous model à la Mirrless 
translates the social aversion to inequality. When the population is discretized, as in Saez 
(2002), it simply corresponds to the pattern of relative weights on different income groups. 
Given a country's set of characteristics (labor supply elasticity, distribution of household 
income, etc.), it is possible, in principle, to derive optimal tax schedules for different 
assumptions about social aversion to inequality and to identify the level for which optimal and 
actual tax rates coincide. This way, Laroque (2005) shows that an optimal schedule derived 
from rawlsian preferences is close to the actual schedule in France and concludes about the 
relatively rawlsian nature of social preferences in this country5. Interestingly, it is possible to 
follow a somewhat dual approach and to focus on social preferences as the subject of 
investigation6. Instead of producing optimal tax schedules under certain assumptions on social 
preferences, the optimal tax model can be inverted on actual effective tax rates to recover the 
implicit social welfare function that makes the observed system optimal7. This approach was 
                                                 
5 Similar conclusions are obtained by Spadaro (2005). Simulating the French and British tax-benefit systems on 
French data, he shows that the former system generates a higher level of social welfare for non-utilitarian values 
of the inequality aversion parameter, which conveys the idea that the concern for redistribution may be larger in 
France, or, alternatively, that labor supply elasticities are lower in this country.  
6 The term "social preference" covers different concepts, often linked but studied independently by different 
branches of the economic literature. In political economy, some surveys attempt to directly measure people's 
attitude towards inequality, as in e.g. the International Social Survey Program, used for instance in Corneo and 
Grüner (2002) and Osberg and Smeeding (2005). In behavioral economics, experiments are often used to assess 
preferences of a group. With the well-known `leaky bucket' experiment, respondents are able to transfer money 
from a rich individual to a poor one but incur a loss of money in the process, so that the equity-efficiency trade-
off is taken into account in measuring tastes for redistribution (see for instance Amiel et al., 1999); in recent 
experiments, participants vote for alternative tax structures (e.g. Ackert et al., 2007). In the public economic 
literature, implicit value judgments may be drawn from inequality measures, assuming a natural rate of 
subjective inequality as suggested by Lambert et al. (2003); see also Duclos (2000). 
7 The effective marginal tax rate corresponds to the implicit tax on a marginal increment of income, which 
accounts for the payment of income taxes and social contribution but also for the withdrawal of means-tested 
benefits as earnings increase.  
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suggested by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2000, 2005, and 2008) using Mirrlees (1971) 
optimal tax model and applied on UK, Spanish and French data8.  
In the present paper we retrieve the implicit social welfare functions by inverting Saez' model 
on national micro data of seven European countries9 (Table 0 informs about the countries 
analyzed as well as their position in the standard classification). For each country, the 
population is partitioned in several income groups and the inverse optimal tax model is 
implemented using actual effective average and marginal tax rates in order to retrieve social 
weights placed on the different groups. 
This approach provides an original way of comparing social preferences across countries. 
Indeed, comparing social assistance expenditures or tax levels across countries does not 
provide a correct rendering of the tastes for redistribution, since the overall redistributive 
effect is not assessed jointly with the efficiency constraint (potential labor supply responses). 
The present approach precisely accounts for incentive constraints and allows reading standard 
information about redistributive systems directly in terms of social weights.  
Looking at the results, there appears to be a clear coincidence of high willingness to 
decommodify and high Rawlsianism in the Scandinavian, social-democratically influenced 
welfare states (Denmark). There is an equally clear coincidence of low willingness and 
utilitarianism in the Anglo–Saxon liberal model (UK) and in the Southern European welfare 
states (Italy and Spain). Finally, the Continental European countries (Finland, Germany and 
France) group closely together in the middle of the scale, as corporatist and etatist. 
Of course, from the beginning of the exposition we want to make clear to the reader that the 
ambition of our analysis is very limited: first, we do not pretend to assess the social 
preferences embedded in the design of the whole social protection system and even less in the 
welfare state. Income taxes and benefits are only a very small part of it. In this sense, our 
contributions should be considered as a first attempt to offer a consistent way to compare 
social preferences across countries with different welfare regimes and possibly different 
efficiency constraints. 
Second, in what follows we will focus on the dichotomy state vs market. In our analysis, the 
family dimension is completely missing. This is an important shortcoming given that the role 
of the family, and in particular, the substitutability between state and families in providing 
protection against decommodification risks, is one of the pillars of the modern debate on the 
structure of the welfare state. 
The previous shortcomings are important and should be kept in mind when reading the paper; 
nevertheless, our contribution must be seen as a step towards the construction of formal 
theorizing allowing for better understanding the nature of welfare system and, eventually, to 
better define (if possible)  ideal-typical models starting from the analysis of real welfare state. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the national tax-benefit systems and a 
first look at their effects on redistribution and incentives. Section 3 describes the model and 
the inversion procedure. Section 4 presents the data and discusses the implementation of the 
model, drawing on previous results on labor supply elasticities. Empirical results are reported 
in Section 5: we derive the social weights that make European tax-benefit systems optimal, 
and we compare results to qualitative analyses of European welfare regime. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
                                                 
8 A well-known limitation of Mirrlees' model is the difficulty to consider non marginal changes in labor supply 
characterizing potential workers switching from non activity to activity or vice versa (the so called participation 
effects) and it may be preferable to adopt the optimal tax model suggested by Saez (2002), which allows 
incorporating labor supply responses at both the intensive and the extensive margin. See Bourguignon and 
Spadaro (2008) for technical details. 
9 A similar exercise, focusing on single mothers, is conducted by Blundell et al. (2006) for a comparison between 
Germany and the UK. 
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2 National Tax-Benefit Systems: Structure, Equity and Efficiency 
 
2.1 Brief Overview of National Systems 
We focus here on direct taxes, contributions and transfers affecting the disposable income of 
households in Europe10. An overview of the 1998 systems for countries under investigation in 
this paper is provided in Table 1. It is accompanied by Figure 1 which reports the share of 
market income, taxes, benefits and replacement incomes, as a proportion of disposable 
income, on average and for bottom and top quintiles.  
Benefits provide financial support to various groups and have different underlying policy 
objectives. Means-tested benefits correspond primarily to social transfers, i.e. social 
assistance and housing benefits, and clearly aim to alleviate poverty. Figure 1 shows that 
those are indeed well targeted to the poorest. However, minimum income schemes are often 
held responsible for work disincentives as withdrawal are high, most often imposing a 100% 
tapering which discourages participation of low-wage workers. This is especially the case in 
countries with generous income support levels (e.g. Nordic countries, France, Germany), 
characterized by high marginal effective tax rates for lower income groups11. 
Southern countries are characterized by the absence of minimum income schemes, and 
families are regular substitutes to the state in supporting unemployed or low-income workers. 
Housing benefits sometimes play an important role in complementing social assistance to 
support low-income families (e.g. in France and, to a lesser extent, in Finland), but are less 
subject to high withdrawal rates. 
Non means-tested benefits have other objectives than pure redistribution, related for instance 
to demographic or employment motives (e.g. child benefits, childcare subsidies). They are 
consequently less targeted to the poor, as illustrated in Figure 1. They rather target specific 
groups such as families with children, disabled individuals (invalidity pensions), and people 
temporarily out of work (maternity and family pensions) or involuntarily out of work 
(unemployment benefits). Child benefit is often universal, even though some components 
may be means-tested (e.g. in France, Germany or Spain). Non means-tested benefits include 
contributory benefits, such as unemployment benefits. The importance of unemployment 
benefits in total expenditures explains the prevailing role of the non means-tested benefit 
category in Figure 1. This is especially true in countries where means-tested benefits are 
limited (e.g. Spain). The inverse is true in the UK, where income support and in-work 
transfers play an important role compared to unemployment insurance; social expenditures 
then appear much more targeted in this country. 
Taxes display a progressive tax rate structure, with tax allowance (e.g. in Germany and 
Finland) or tax free brackets (e.g. in France) to exempt lowest incomes from tax. These 
exemptions may be important. For instance, in France in 1998, all households are subject to 
the 8% social security flat-rate tax but only half of the population is subject to the progressive 
income taxation. The redistributive effect of the income tax scheme is function of the tax level 
and the progressivity of the tax schedule. Couples are jointly (income) taxed in France and 
Germany, causing high marginal tax rates on secondary earners. 
Social security contributions (SSC) (not reported in table 1) are levied on earnings and 
sometimes on benefits. Often shared between employers and employees, they are generally 
designed as a flat-rate structure aimed to finance pensions, health and unemployment 
insurance. They are not neutral, however, as zero payments below a threshold and a cap on 
                                                 
10 Indirect taxes are an important source of public spending financing. Their proportional (to consumption) 
character jointly with the existence of a very small number of different rates, gives them a marginal weight as 
redistributive device. This is the reason why we decided to skip them from the following analysis. For a detailed 
discussion on indirect taxes, notably VAT and excise taxes on specific goods, see Immervoll et al. (2005). 
11 Social assistance (minimum income or minimum pension) is often more generous for certain groups such as 
single parent families (e.g. in France) or pensioners (e.g. in Finland). 
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the contribution base above an upper limit generate some discontinuities and necessarily have 
distributive effects. SSC are substantial - sometimes exceeding income tax rates - especially 
in countries with large public pensions and health insurance systems. This is for instance the 
case for Germany and France, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
2.2 Redistributive and Incentive Effects 
European systems provide a rich ground to implement the optimal tax framework and the 
inverse approach used in this paper. Firstly, a substantial redistributive system exists even for 
single individuals in several European systems, which we can exploit for vertical equity 
analysis. The variety of transfers is larger when looking at families (or, more generally, to 
other demographic groups than working age single individuals), and potentially allows 
interpreting social preferences for both vertical and horizontal equity.  
Secondly, we can exploit differences across countries to analyze significant divergences in 
social preferences, from a system without social assistance (Spain) to one with highly 
generous income support (Denmark).  
Budget constraints for hypothetical single individuals, as represented in Figure 2, provide 
early intuitions and show nuances across countries. Within the Nordic group, both Denmark 
and Finland are characterized by generous social assistance but the marginal tax rates are 
higher in the former country and Denmark seems more similar to Germany on both accounts. 
All countries with minimum income schemes (all except southern countries) are characterized 
by a relatively flat budget constraint at low income level, due to the high taper rates 
responsible for very high effective marginal tax rates, as previously noticed. Despite very 
different systems, the combination of the different tax-benefit instruments in France and the 
UK lead to very similar budget constraints in the two countries, a fact already noticed by 
Atkinson, Chiappori and Bourguignon (1988). 
Naturally, the effect of national systems can only be partially rendered trough the use of a 
representative agent. A more comprehensive characterization of the redistributive and 
incentive effects requires applying national systems to representative datasets, as it is done 
here by using the EUROMOD pan-European tax-benefit simulator and national micro data 
(see description in the following sections). On the redistributive side, the redistributive effect 
of the different instruments could be analyzed and decomposed12. 
We assess the overall redistributive effect of benefits and taxes, using Gini coefficient as a 
summary of total inequality. Figure 3 reports the decrease in the Gini coefficient on market 
income due to benefits, public pensions and unemployment benefits13. 
There is a clear contrast between Nordic and Corporatist regimes on the one hand, with large 
redistributive effects due to both contributory and non-contributory benefits, and Southern 
countries plus the UK on the other hand14. 
Smaller effects in this second group are due to small social benefits in Spain and Italy and 
small replacement income in the UK. Figure 3 also reports the decrease in the Gini coefficient 
on market income due to the whole set of tax-benefit instruments, i.e. previously mentioned 
benefits plus taxes and social security contributions. This corresponds simply to the move 
from the Gini on market incomes to the Gini on disposable incomes. The same contrast 
between the two groups of countries remains after inclusion of income tax and social 
contributions. As expected, there are cross-country differences in the relative role of the two 
                                                 
12 For instance, Wagstaff et al. (1999) carefully decompose the redistributive effect of income taxation into tax 
levels and progressivity effects for several OECD countries. Important differences across countries emerge, 
showing for instance high (low) average tax but lower (higher) progressivity in Nordic countries (France). 
13 Market income corresponds to wage salary, self employment income, capital income, alimony and other 
private transfers. 
14 In the first group of countries, benefits achieve the most inequality reduction mainly due to contributory 
benefits and public pensions; means-testing plays a small role (see Immervoll et al., 2007). 
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groups of instruments. In particular, benefits and replacement incomes achieve more 
redistribution in France (reduction in the market income Gini of 37%, versus 35% in 
Denmark) while the overall redistributive effect is largest in Denmark (49% versus 46% in 
France) because of the relatively larger effect of taxes in this country. 
We now turn to the effects of tax-benefit systems on work incentives. We characterize these 
effects using effective marginal tax rates (EMTR), i.e. the implicit taxation (reduction in 
disposable income) of an additional Euro of market income. Thus the distribution of average 
EMTR per deciles, reported in Figure 4, gives some insight on the (dis)incentive potential of 
tax-benefit systems15. The shape of these patterns has been discussed in several studies (see 
Bourguignon, 1997, and Immervoll et al., 2006, among others). We group EMTR 
distributions according to the following classification: Social Democratic (Denmark), 
Corporativist (Finland, France and Germany), Liberal (UK) and Southern European (Italy and 
Spain). As expected, the overall tax level if highest in Nordic countries. EMTR are high for 
lower deciles in all countries with means-tested social assistance, due to aforementioned 
phasing out at high taper rate. Institutional disincentives to work must be combined with 
participation elasticities, which capture other country-specific aspects (e.g. costs of work), to 
explain outcomes in terms of participation. Figure 5 reports employment rates for the selected 
countries. It appears that male participation is high in all countries and relatively less sensitive 
to tax-benefit incentives than female labor supply. For the latter, participation is very high in 
Nordic countries despite large EMTRs, which is partly explained by other institutional 
features, in particular a set of pro-family policies which decrease cost of work for women and 
encourage female activity. Participation is lower in France and Germany, a fact often 
explained by the combination of less pro-family policies, social norms (in Germany) and high 
taxation on secondary earners due to joint taxation. Female employment is even lower in 
Southern countries, despite lower tax rates, and explanations are to be found in different 
family arrangements and lower female wages. While average tax rates are smaller than 
EMTRs for low incomes, they are getting closer as income increases. For high incomes, then, 
both effective marginal and average tax rates are high in Nordic countries and could generate 
disincentives at the intensive margin; the same is true in France or Germany for the very top 
of the distribution (not visible in the average for the last decile). 
 
3 The Inverse Optimal Tax Approach 
 
3.1 The Model of Saez (2002) 
The starting point of Saez (2002) is the standard optimal income tax model à la Mirrlees 
(1971). The government is assumed to maximize a social welfare function subject to an 
aggregate budget constraint. The social welfare function aggregates individual utility levels, 
which themselves depend on disposable household income (equivalent to consumption in a 
static framework) and leisure. The form of the social welfare function characterizes the 
government's taste for redistribution, ranging from rawlsian preferences (maximization of the 
welfare of the poorest person) to utilitarian preferences (equal weights on all individuals). 
Actual productivities are not observed so that governments can only rely on second-best 
taxation based on incomes. Consequently, they must account for the efficiency constraint: 
agents modify their taxable income in function of effective taxation. Responses operate both 
at the extensive margin (participation decisions) and the intensive margin (effort or hours of 
                                                 
15 EMTR are computed numerically by incrementing marginally the labor income of the main earner in the 
household. Clearly, more accurate characterization of the participation incentives should rely on replacement 
rate, or financial gains to work, or participation tax (Immervoll 2002). These three concepts are somewhat 
equivalent and reflect the differential between standards of living when inactive (on welfare) and in work. 
EMTR give some indications but do not give the full picture of such (non-marginal) transitions. 
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work). In particular, high implicit taxes on the most (least) productive ones may reduce their 
effort (participation), thereby reducing the tax base16. 
Only the intensive margin is considered in the original model of Mirrlees (1971), while 
empirical evidence points towards an important effect of participation decisions (see 
Heckman, 1993). 
Saez (2002) sets up an optimal tax problem where there are I+1 discrete groups in the labor 
market: I groups of individuals who do work, ranked by increasing gross income levels Yi 
indexed i=1,...I, and a group consisting of those who do not work (group i=0). 
Individuals choose whether or not to participate (extensive margin) and which group to 
choose (intensive margin). Formally, individuals are indexed by m ∈ M being a set of 
measure one. The measure of individuals on M is denoted by dv(m). Individual m ∈ M has a 
utility function um(Ci,i) defined on after-tax income Ci ≥ 0 and job choice i = 0, . . . , I. Each 
individual chooses i to maximize um(Ci,i), where Ci = Yi - Ti is the after-tax reward in 
occupation i. The labour supply decision of individual m is denoted by i*∈{0, 1, . . . , I}. For 
a given tax and transfer schedule (C0, . . . , CI), the set M is partitioned into I +1 subsets, M0, . 
. . , MI, defining the sets of individuals choosing, respectively, each of the occupations 0, . . . , 
I. The fraction of individuals choosing occupation i, denoted by hi(C0, . . . , CI) is simply the 
measure of set Mi. It is assumed that the tastes for work embodied in the individual utilities 
are regularly distributed so that the aggregate functions hi are differentiable17.  
The government chooses (T0, . . . , TI) so as to maximize welfare: 
)(),( *** mdviTYuW
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where μm is the weight the government assigns to agent m. Φ is the exogenous government 
financial constraint.  
In this framework, the optimal set of Ti is determined by a system of I+1 first order conditions 
of the following form (see Saez, 2002, for a formal derivation): 
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jointly with the constraint (b.c.) 
The term on the left-hand side of (1a) is the extra tax paid when moving from group i-1 to i 
divided by the gain in net income. Non-workers receive benefits -T0, by definition identical to 
C0. The social welfare function is summarized by gi, the marginal weight the government 
assigns to group i. This weight represents the value (expressed in terms of public funds) of 
giving an additional euro to an individual in group i. It is defined as follows: 
i
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16 At the top of the skill distribution, high implicit tax rates are due to high marginal income tax rates. At the 
bottom, they are caused by high withdrawal (phase-out) rates of means-tested social assistance schemes. 
17 Note that optimal income schedules must verify the property of agent monotonicity, according to which gross 
income increases with productivity (which is not necessarily the case of labor supply, as the labor supply curve 
may be backward bending). This is sometimes expressed as the Spence-Mirrlees (or single crossing) condition 
that a more productive agent will choose a higher consumption-income allocation, so that second best taxation 
manages to separate types and guarantees incentive-compatibility. Here, the implicit assumption is that types 0 to 
I are ranked according to productivity levels so that Yi increases with w. 
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Where p is the multiplier of the government budget constraint. An alternative interpretation of 
gi is that the government is indifferent between giving one more Euro to an individual in 
occupation i and gi more Euros of public funds. 
The intensive elasticity, ςi, is defined as: 
)( 1
1
−
−
−
−
=
ii
i
i
ii
i CCd
dh
h
CCς    (2) 
This mobility elasticity captures the percentage increase in supply of group i when Ci-Ci-1 is 
increased by 1%, and is defined under the assumption that individuals are restricted to adjust 
their labor supply to the neighboring choice18.     
Finally, ηi is a measure of the extensive elasticity, and is defined as the percentage of 
individuals in group i who stops working when the difference between the net household 
income out of work and at earnings point i is reduced by 1%: 
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=η       (3) 
The main implication of the optimal tax rule above is that the optimal tax system depends 
heavily on whether labor supply responses are concentrated at the intensive or extensive 
margin. When the extensive elasticity is assumed to be zero, the model of Saez is a discrete 
version of that of Mirrlees and gives identical results.  It can be demonstrated (Saez 2002) 
that, in the case where income effects are ruled out, hi(C0+R, . . . , CI +R)  = hi(C0, . . . , CI). 
Thus, ∑
=
=
∂
∂I
j i
j
c
h
0
0  , and therefore, an additional constraint normalizes weights as follows: 
1
0
=∑
=
I
i
ii gh       (4) 
 
3.2 Inversion of the Model 
The inversion of the preceding optimal tax problem is a very simple idea. It consists in 
recovering, starting from the observed distribution of income before (Yi) and after 
redistribution (Ci) and corresponding tax rates (Ti), the social welfare function that would 
make the observed tax rate schedule optimal. In other words, the issue of the optimality of an 
existing tax-benefit system is transformed into the issue of the shape of the social welfare 
function associated with that system. 
A formal definition of the optimal inverse problem (as in Bourguignon and Spadaro 2008) is 
the following: 
 
Find the set of gi satisfying simultaneously (1a) and (4) 19 
 
Simple algebra makes possible to obtain the following analytical expressions: 
1
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18 Note that this hypothesis can appear as restrictive given that, in principle, individuals can move outside their 
neighbor choice. Empirical evidence shows that the eventual error made is very small. 
19 Note that this definition builds on the first order conditions of the social planner maximization problem. As 
Bourguignon and Spadaro (2008) show, it holds only if the maximization problem to be inverted is concave. In 
Bourguignon and Spadaro (2008) the set of “concavity tests” for an optimal inverse tax problem is given. These 
tests basically consist in checking that the revealed social welfare function is concave in their arguments. As we 
will show later, our empirical results are compatible with the hypothesis of concavity of the whole problem. 
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which allows us to compute recursively the weights gi using observed incomes Yi, net taxes Ti, 
disposable incomes Ci and a set of values for participation and intensive elasticities. 
Weights gi correspond to the marginal social welfare function in the continuous model à la 
Mirrlees.  
 
4 Data and Implementation 
 
4.1 Data 
Simulations for all countries are performed using the tax-benefit calculator EUROMOD. This 
model has been designed to simulate the tax-benefit systems of the EU-15 countries. For each 
country, it computes all direct taxes and monetary transfers, and hence disposable income, for 
all the households of a representative dataset (see Sutherland, 2001 and Immervoll et al. 
2005). The choice of the initial system (1998) is made available for all 15 countries and 
updates for years 2001 and 2003 become available. However, we have opted for the year 1998 
as it has been proof-checked through a variety of exercises and it is the most reliable (see 
Bargain, 2006). Table 2 reports the different national household data used to simulate tax-
benefit systems. These datasets are all representative of each population. 
The treatment of the family composition in the optimal tax framework is a difficult task. We 
therefore focus on a sample of single men and women20. 
We select potential salary workers in the age range 18-65 (i.e. excluding pensioners, students, 
farmers and self-employed). To keep up with the logic of the optimal tax model, we exclude 
all households where capital income represents more than 10% of total gross income21. 
Unemployment benefit is treated as a replacement income from work and unemployed are 
thus considered in the same way as actual workers; this leaves nonetheless the option to treat 
unemployment benefit as pure redistribution or as pure insurance in the implementation of the 
model, as discussed below. Sample sizes are reported in Table 2.  
 
4.2 The Treatment of Social Contribution and Replacement Incomes 
Replacement incomes, which include social retirement benefits and unemployment benefits, 
deserve special attention. These are part of the public sector transfers but also comprise a 
redistributive component, at least in some countries. Thus, a simple treatment of these 
incomes would be to put them beside purely redistributive transfers. The opposite stance 
consists in focusing on the social insurance roots of replacement incomes, as done by some 
authors like Bourguignon (1997). Since in most countries public pensions and unemployment 
benefits are linked to workers' past earnings through social security contributions when active, 
                                                 
20 Immervoll et al. (2007) choose to include all working-age individuals in the population but this implies 
ignoring the joint decision in couple households. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2008) also ignore this dimension by 
treating families as providers of a common labor supply function and characterized by a household productivity. 
21 Empirical evidence seems to show that there is a positive correlation among labor supply elasticity and level 
of capital (see Carbonnier for France, 2007). Thus, excluding “capitalists” implies a reduction of the labor supply 
elasticity for higher incomes. Nevertheless, the overall effects in term of social marginal weights are difficult to 
anticipate. It would be better to use a completely different optimal tax model. 
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they can be viewed as delayed salaries22. A careful sensitivity analysis requires checking 
results with both options23. In the same line of reasoning, one may consider the redistributive 
effects of social security contributions (cf. Rochet 1996 on health contributions in France). 
Alternatively, one may see this instrument as pure contributions to personal insurance in case 
of sickness, unemployment or old age24. 
In the baseline above, the former case is used, with gross income as the starting point to 
evaluate the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system including the effect of SSC25.  
 
4.3 Defining Groups 
The definition of the I+1 groups necessarily bears some arbitrariness in the way we partition 
the population. A large number of groups would probably be detrimental to the cross-country 
comparison. Keeping this constraint in mind, we opt for a small number of groups (I=5) that 
are made somewhat comparable. Group 0 is identified as the population of `idle poor', with 
zero market income, while group 1 is going to be the “working poor” population. The 
following groups are defined consistently in reference to the median income of each country. 
Cut-off points (lower bounds), gross income and disposable income for each income group 
are reported in Table 3. The corresponding proportion of the selected population in each 
group is reported in Table 4. Precisely, group 0 gather those with no labor income or very 
small amounts, the upper limit being the level corresponding to a part-time job paid at 
minimum wage. The number of observations between zero and this upper bound is very small 
in most countries, essentially due to the presence of fixed costs of working. For the next group 
(1), the population of working poor, the upper income limit is fixed as 1.3 times the minimum 
wage (or 1.3 time 60% of the median for countries without minimum wage). Group 2 is upper 
bounded by the median income, group 3 by 1.5 times the median income and group 4 by 
twice the median. 
 
4.4 Labor Supply Elasticities 
The magnitude of disincentive effects due to effective taxation depends crucially on the size 
of elasticities. However, the relative consensus which has emerged from the large literature on 
labor supply has not proved to be extremely precise. It establishes that income-elasticity is 
usually negative while own wage-elasticity are positive, below one and larger for married 
women due to larger responsiveness at the extensive margin (cf. Blundell and MaCurdy, 
1999, Heckman, 1993). Some authors have dealt with this issue by relying on the latest 
econometric techniques to estimate as accurately as possible elasticities of countries under 
investigation (cf. Laroque, 2005, using empirical results of Laroque and Salanié, 2001). Other 
                                                 
22 The differences in the extent of social security programs among developed countries, along with the 
substitution between public and private assurance has driven the literature to limit the redistributive analysis to 
non-contributive social benefits and taxes. 
23 Since we focus on working age households, we can leave aside the problem of public pensions. Yet, all 
countries operate unemployment insurance benefits. Those generally expire after some maximum duration 
and/or are conditional on participating in some type of active labor market program. By definition, these 
schemes are meant to replace lost earnings due to job loss. By narrowing the difference in disposable income 
when working and when not working, they substantially reduce gains to work, at least temporarily. Yet, except 
where they are affected by the spouse's earnings, they generally have no effect on the marginal tax rate of those 
in work. As a result, in the presence of positive labor supply participation elasticities, unemployment benefits 
certainly contribute to making in-work benefits more desirable. In the baseline, we therefore combine 
unemployment benefits to market income. 
24 For instance, see Borsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001) for a decomposition of the (public) pay-as-you-go 
pension systems between its role as insurance against longevity-related old-age poverty (and related risks) and its 
redistributive role. 
25 Given the objectives of our research, choosing a particular criterion of definition of income assumes a strong 
normative character. This is the reason why we put a lot of emphasis in the description of the data selection 
procedure. 
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authors acknowledge both the limits of our empirical knowledge and the fact that responses in 
terms of hours and participation may not summarize all the possible effects -- high incomes, 
in particular, may response via changes in effort or via tax evasion. These authors, in 
particular Saez (2002) for the US and Spadaro (2005), Bourguignon and Spadaro (2008) and 
Immervoll et al. (2007) for EU countries, then analyze results of the Mirrlees model in the 
light of several hypothesis (upper and lower bounds) on the elasticity level. 
While there is a wide empirical literature on the labor supply of married women (see Blundell 
and MaCurdy, 1999), evidence about singles, and in particular childless singles, is limited. 
Table 5 summarizes some of the relevant studies. 
It appears that, for singles, there is no evidence of participation elasticity larger than 0.5 (in 
contrast to married women). Moreover, the formula describing participation elasticity, i.e. 
expression (3), is slightly different from the elasticity usually measured in the literature. The 
latter is obtained by 1% increase in Yi rather than in Ci-C0=Yi-(Ti+C0). In most cases, 
Ti+C0>0 so that Ci-C0 increases by more than 1% and ηi is therefore overstated by usual 
estimates. The inverse is true only when Ti<-C0, i.e. when transfers to working poor are very 
large. 
For the intensive margin, evidence for singles is also limited and points out towards modest 
sized elasticities (cf Table 5). Yet, the classical labor supply elasticity (as in Mirrlees, 1971) is 
defined as the change in labor supply L in response to a marginal change in productivity: 
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As shown in Saez (2002), the classical labor supply elasticity, εi, is then related to the 
intensive elasticity previously defined, ςi by the expression: 
iiiii YYY ες =− − )( 1  
In the present case, we could not estimate labor supply models for 7 countries and also rely on 
estimates drawn from the literature (see Table 5), emphasizing the importance of 
differentiating between intensive and extensive margins. 
 
5 Empirical Results 
The first type of findings we are looking for is a characterization of the redistributive tastes of 
each country using the inverse optimal tax approach. In particular, we want to check if 
marginal social weights are decreasing, as expected from a social planner with aversion for 
inequalities. The assumption of optimality of actual system is interesting per se. What matters 
is not the dynamic process leading to a given system but the fact that different systems in 
neighbor countries may reflect, among other things, differences in social preferences. 
We also want to check if weights are placed on the idle poor (group 0) or rather on the 
working poor (group 1), reflecting value judgments regarding the role of personal 
responsibility in financial conditions and the way this affects institutional redistribution.  
Standard assumptions, as described previously, lead to results for the baseline scenario, as 
reported in Figure 6. Alternative assumptions on the elasticity levels provide a sensitivity 
analysis for each country, as summarized in Figure 7.  
About the “optimality concerns” we recover here the same qualitative results obtained in 
Bourguignon and Spadaro (2000): Figure 6 shows `flat' redistributive tastes in Southern 
Europe and, to some extent, in the UK. In contrast, generous social assistance translates into 
high weights on group 0 in Nordic countries, Germany and France. For those countries, 
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however, weights in other groups are relatively flat. In general, marginal social welfare is 
both positive and flat or decreasing throughout the range of individual incomes classes, which 
convey that these systems are not far from Rawlsian preferences. This result suggests that the 
redistribution systems in these countries are consistent with the hypothesis of an optimizing 
redistribution authority. Clearly, the basic optimization problem would not make sense if the 
objective function were not concave. This is an interesting result, which was certainly not 
guaranteed by the inversion methodology used in this paper. Moreover it acquires a strong 
relevance given the heterogeneity of the redistribution systems and the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the countries analyzed. 
The results also show the importance of including in the whole analysis the efficiency 
concerns: Figure 6 shows that, in most of the cases the weight on group 1, representing the 
working poor, is smaller than the weight on group 0. This result rationalizes the fact that 
working poor are subject to very high distortions corresponding to the high phase-out rate of 
social assistance (especially in Nordic countries), as previously documented by the 
distribution of effective marginal tax rates. As can be seen in Figure 7, the gap between 
weights on groups 0 and 1 is even larger when participation elasticity is large, which 
reinforces previous interpretation. In other words, higher responses at the extensive margin 
should motivate higher in-work transfers (and lower withdrawal rate) for the working poor; it 
does not occur, which can only be justified by even smaller weights on this group. Another 
important result from Figure 7 is the fact that the weight patterns do not vary too much with 
alternative assumptions, apart from the absolute level of weights on group 026. 
Concerning the main objective of our analysis (i.e. looking at the social value judgments 
regarding the role of personal responsibility in financial conditions and the way this affects 
institutional redistribution), results from Figure 6 are in line with the standard classification of 
the welfare regimes (Esping Andersen, 1999, Pestieau 2006). Recall that our basic work 
hypothesis is that a high social marginal weight of group 0 is assimilated to a strong level of 
decommodification. It implies that on the y-axis of Figure 6 we can read a metrics of the level 
of the “willingness to decommodify citizens” of each social planner. 
There appears to be a clear coincidence of high willingness and high Rawlsianism in the 
Scandinavian, social-democratically influenced welfare states (Denmark). There is an equally 
clear coincidence of low willingness and utilitarianism in the Anglo–Saxon liberal model 
(UK) and in the Southern European welfare states (Italy and Spain). Finally, the Continental 
European countries (Finland, Germany and France) group closely together in the middle of 
the scale, as corporatist and etatist.  
The rank obtained inverting our optimal tax model supports the standard classification made 
by several authors (Esping Andersen 1999, Pestieau 2006). This is the most relevant and 
striking result (which, again, was certainly not guaranteed by the methodology used in this 
paper). 
An important comment must be made here. The budget constraints represented in Figure 2 
certainly provide a first idea on the “willingness to decommodify citizens” of each national 
system. The higher is the guaranteed minimum income (i.e. the intercept of each line) the 
higher will be the decommodification. Unfortunately, looking at Figure 2 is not enough to 
reveal the preferences of the social planner: it is extremely important to include efficiency 
(i.e. taking into account different behavioral responses) and socio-demographic aspects (i.e. 
taking into account differences in the income / wages distributions of each national 
population).  
The cases of Denmark and Germany are illustrative: both are characterized by generous social 
assistance (the guaranteed minimum income is the same) but the low incomes marginal tax 
                                                 
26 As expected, the tighter the efficiency constraint at the extensive margin, i.e. the larger participation 
elasticities, the less generous transfers to the idle poor must be. The fact that this does not happen is rationalized 
by all the larger weights on this group. 
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rates are higher in the former country (see Figure 2: the derivative of the Danish budget 
constraint for low incomes is flatter. See also Figure 4). The results of the inversion of the 
optimal problem in the two countries give very different pictures (as shown in Figure 6): 
skipping the efficiency concerns can lead to misleading conclusions. 
The results obtained with the inversion methodology are in line with the “decommodification 
ranking” computed by Esping Andersen (1990 and 1999) and also with other attempts, based 
on aggregate indicators, to compute some decommodification index for European countries 
(see Menahem 2007). 
 
6 Conclusions 
The aim of this paper has been to contribute to the debate regarding the typology of welfare 
states by offering a formal theorizing drawing from the optimal taxation literature (Mirrlees 
1971) and allowing for comparative research on the structure of the Welfare State taking 
explicitly into account the efficiency concerns of the redistribution policies.  
In order to assess the degree of decommodification of seven European welfare systems 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990), we have derived the shape of their social welfare functions by 
inverting the optimal tax model of Saez (2002) on actual average tax rate, under the (work) 
assumption that existing system are optimal for the government. Actual distributions of 
incomes before and after redistribution are obtained using a pan-European tax-benefit 
microsimulation model.  
The discussion of the results in the light of standard classifications of welfare regimes in 
Europe had shown that there is a robust coincidence of high decommodification and high 
Rawlsianism in the Scandinavian, social-democratically influenced welfare states (Denmark). 
There is an equally clear coincidence of low decommodification and utilitarianism in the 
Anglo–Saxon liberal model (UK) and in the Southern European welfare states (Italy and 
Spain). Finally, the Continental European countries (Finland, Germany and France) group 
closely together in the middle of the scale, as corporatist and etatist. 
We have shown the potential usefulness of this approach: by using it, it is possible to build a 
metrics that allows measuring the degree of (dis)similarity of the redistribution systems 
analyzed. It means that we are able to compare, in a consistent way, social preferences across 
countries with different welfare regimes and possibly different efficiency constraints.  
The analysis performed highlighted the importance of taking seriously into account the agent 
behavioral reactions in this type of analysis. About this issue, it is important to emphasize that 
the economic empirical literature has pointed out towards larger elasticities at the extensive 
margin. If participation’ elasticities are large, then targeting the working poor through in-work 
transfers is preferable than generous social assistance schemes. This rationalizes the choice of 
a generous EITC in the US, as discussed by Saez (2002).  
All European regimes investigated, with the exception of Southern countries, are, on the 
contrary, characterized by important redistribution towards the idle poor and the absence of 
in-work transfer to childless singles (implemented in the UK only in 2003), which must be 
justified by either small participation elasticity and/or large redistributive tastes for this group. 
Our work purely explores the cross-country dimension but extensions to account for changes 
over time are desirable. In particular, recent trend towards EITC schemes in Europe may 
translate a change in social preferences, or the recognition of the disincentive effects. 
This may be the case in particular for some groups, i.e. single mothers, for whom 
participation elasticity is larger. Interestingly, even stronger differences across countries exist 
for this group, as illustrated by the budget curves of Figure 8. In particular, large transfers to 
unemployed (Nordic and corporatist models) contrast with large transfers to working poor 
singles with children (UK). As suggested above, divergences may come from differences in 
efficiency constraints or from significantly differences in social preferences. In the limit of 
our exercise on (childless) single individuals, cross-country differences are fairly robust to 
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different assumptions on elasticity and clearly distinguish welfare regimes in terms of social 
preferences. Future work must check the validity of these results and exploit the (even larger) 
heterogeneity across EU countries when it comes to single mothers (see Blundell et al. 2006 
for a focus on this group in the case of the UK and Germany)27. Also, more attention must be 
paid to the role of unemployment benefits and social contributions, as extensively discussed 
in the text. 
Another interesting line of research is to treat social preferences as endogenously determined.  
In particular, it would be interesting to question how social preferences are shaped by 
society's belief about fairness and luck (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005) or how they translate 
into the political process. Yet, this work could possibly be extended to account for the link 
between the design of redistributive policies and social choice28. Coggins and Perali (2002) 
suggest an exciting first attempt in this direction, revealing social preferences by connecting a 
social welfare function to a voting mechanism. 
Future work should be also directed to include in the analysis the dynamic dimension of the 
construction of the welfare state (that in our paper is missing). Given the importance of the 
issue of intergenerational solidarity and the role of welfare state in his enhancement (Masson 
2007, 2004a, 2004b, 2002), it would be interesting, for example, to try to fix a link between 
the ideal typology proposed in the comparative welfare state literature (Esping Andersen 1999 
and Pestieau 2006) and the theoretical literature on the optimal design of pensions system (see 
Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau 2007). 
Our last remarks concern the limits of the suggested exercise (that we have already discussed 
all along the text). First and most important: we are aware that income taxes and benefits are 
only a very small part of the welfare state. In this sense, our contribution must be seen as a 
step towards the construction of formal theorizing allowing for better understanding the 
nature of welfare system and, eventually, to better define (if possible)  ideal-typical models 
starting from the analysis of real welfare state. 
Second: it is natural to think that real world tax-benefit schedules result more from political 
economy forces than from the pursuit of some well defined social objective. Even though, 
deriving and comparing social welfare functions implicit in each national system provide a 
new way to compare countries’ tastes for redistribution as embodied in tax-benefit systems.  
Third, the differences between countries are computed on the basis of the inversion of the tax 
model on single individuals. The family dimension is completely missing in our analysis. This 
is an important shortcoming given that the role of the family, and in particular, the 
substitutability between state and families in providing protection against decommodification 
risks, is one of the pillars of the standard debate.  
While it is customary to compare systems in terms of (effective) average and marginal tax 
rates, degree of progressivity or degree redistribution (e.g. change in Gini due to the impact of 
tax-benefit systems), the present approach allows reading actual tax-benefit systems, and their 
recent evolutions, through the social preferences that they reveal. 
                                                 
27 One of the questions is: are negative EMTR generated by the WFTC, as can be observed on Figure 8, due to 
larger participation elasticity for single mums in the UK or to higher weight g1? See Laroque (2005) on the 
justification of negative EMTR in the optimal tax framework. 
28 Systems in force may reflect to some extent the redistributive concern of the party or coalition in power, hence 
of only part of the electorate. This is fairly evident in periods following a change of majority; Oliver and Spadaro 
(2004) show for instance that the arrival of the right-wing Aznar government in Spain has been followed by a tax 
reform that can be interpreted in terms of changes in the redistributive concern of the State. Therefore, we should 
remain cautious with the term `social' preference -- the reconciling political economy process is beyond our 
scope.  Note, however, that the whole system does not change at each election and the alternance of majorities in 
Europe -- even if leading to some reshaping of redistributive systems -- may still leave room for significant 
differences `on average' between countries. In particular, political spectrums in different countries are not 
perfectly overlapping. Overall, then, we argue that cross-country differences in underlying social preferences 
may be important and deserve characterization. 
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Table 0. “Standard” classification of the seven Countries analyzed (Esping Andersen 1999 
and Pestieau 2006) 
 
 Social democracy Corporativist Liberal 
Southern 
European 
Degree of 
decommodification Strong Medium Weak Weak 
Ideological 
reference point Universalism 
Social Hierarchy, 
Family 
Individual 
responsibility Family 
Degree of 
defamiliarization Strong Weak Strong Weak 
Countries Denmark Finland, Germany, France UK 
Spain, 
Italy 
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Table 1: Tax System, Social Benefits and Replacement Incomes 
 
 Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Spain United Kingdom 
Income Tax System 
No of tax bands 3 6 6 3& 5 8 3 
Lowest/highest tax band 
limit * § 12 / 100 35 / 223 30 / 336 30 / 252 0 / 118 22 / 492 29 / 220 
Lowest/highest tax rate §§ .40 / .59 .235 / .557 .185 / .62 .273 / .557 .185 / .455 .20 / .56 .20 / .40 
Main tax credit* up to 6 3 
Tax unit individual individual family family individual 
family        
(individual 
optional) 
individual 
Family-related tax 
provision 
unused 
deductions 
transferrabl
e to spouse
  
choice of tax free 
allowance or 
child benefit 
up to 2 tax 
credit per 
dependent 
family 
members 
up to 2 tax credit 
per child (plus 
additional 
amounts in 
some regions)
2 tax credit for 
married 
couples; 13 
tax deduction 
for lone 
parents 
Social Assistance  
Max. amount* 34 + housing allowance 
18 + reasonable 
housing 
costs 
24 13 
none at the 
national 
level 
none at the 
national level 18 
Disregard* up to 9 4 2 - 4 
Withdrawal rate 1 1 1 .75 - 1 1 
Note: social assistance is not taxable except in Denmark 
Housing Benefit 
 22 
Max. amount* 
3 if no children; 
14 if 
children 
17 15 25 
none at the 
national 
level 
none at the 
national level 
100% of 
recognised 
rent; 100% of 
council tax 
Withdrawal rate .75 .80 .34 .40   
65% (housing 
benefit); 20% 
(council tax 
benefit) 
Family Benefits 
Amount* 
3–4 per child; 
higher for 
lone 
parents; 
plus day-
care 
subsidy 
5–9 per child; 
plus 2 per 
child for 
lone 
parents; 
plus day-
care 
subsidy 
main benefit: 7 
to 12 for 
2nd and 
further 
children; 
special 
benefits for 
young 
children 
5–9 per child; plus 
5–7 child 
raising 
benefits for 
very young 
children 
see 
employme
nt 
conditiona
l benefits 
2 for first child, 
0.2 for further 
children 
3–5 per child 
Withdrawal rate   
main benefit: 
100% once 
income > 
174–261 
young child 
raising benefit: 
20–40% once 
income > 62 
 
100% of income > 
55  
Unemployment Benefits 
Floor 
56 (if previous
job full-
time) 
22 30   33  
Rate or amount* 90% of gross minus SSC
up to 42% of 
net 
exceeding 
22 
57-75% of 
gross 60% of net 30% of gross 70% of gross 18 
 23 
Ceiling 68  313 125 66 75  
Taxable §§§ IT: yes,  SSC: partly no 
IT: yes,  
SSC: yes no 
IT: yes,  
SSC: no 
IT: yes,  
SSC: reduced 
IT: yes,  
SSC: no 
General note: except for family benefits all rates are for single benefit recipients without children 
* in % of median gross employment income (not including employer social security contributions) 
& MTR increases progressively between lower and middle and between middle and top tax bands 
§  The lowest bounds accounts for standard tax-free allowances, deductions or exemptions available to single employees, i.e. represents the upper bound of the zero-tax income range 
§§ Rates include special social security tax (CSG: 7.5%, CRDS: 0.5%), solidarity surplus tax in Germany (5.5%); they combine flat-tax municipal taxation and progressive national 
taxation for Finland and Denmark. For these two countries, municipal tax rates differ between municipalities and we count here the average (17.5% in Finland, 32.4% in Denmark). In 
Denmark, a 'tax shield' of 59% is applied as top rate. 
§§§ IT = income tax; SSC = social security contributions;
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Table 2: Data Description 
 
Country Data Year size of 
selected 
sample  
weighted no. 
of singles 
proportion of 
all singles 
Denmark European Community Household Panel 1995 574 417,945 40% 
Finland Income distribution survey 1998 1193 421,447 38% 
France Household Budget Survey 1994/5 1639 3,615,095 40% 
Germany German Socio-Economic Panel 1998 1387 8,242,791 43% 
UK Family Expenditure Survey 1995/6 1227 5,172,454 47% 
Italy Survey of Households Income and Wealth 1996 1482 3,651,857 51% 
Spain European Community Household Panel 1996 738 1,297,780 37% 
 
 
Table 3: Cut-off points, gross income and disposable income of the Income Groups 
 
  groups 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Denmark 
cut off point 0 788 2050 2628 3942 5256 
Yi 0 1432 2342 3125 4499 6475 
Ci 668 1112 1523 1858 2424 3650 
Finland 
cut off point 0 574 1492 1823 2735 3646 
Yi 0 1109 1643 2180 3136 4167 
Ci 623 969 1242 1537 2027 2670 
France 
cut off point 0 515 1338 1674 2511 3348 
Yi 0 907 1437 2031 2864 4201 
Ci 554 918 1186 1584 2216 3084 
Germany 
cut off point 0 627 1630 2094 3141 4188 
Yi 0 1184 1887 2503 3563 5013 
Ci 468 1019 1306 1620 2229 3180 
Italy 
cut off point 0 509 1322 1695 2543 3390 
Yi 0 686 1393 1840 2326 3944 
Ci 30 569 1068 1359 1650 2697 
Spain 
cut off point 0 399 1038 1331 1997 2662 
Yi 0 749 1169 1645 2255 3187 
Ci 280 917 1326 1629 2054 2711 
UK 
cut off point 0 595 1548 1984 2976 3968 
Yi 0 1101 1697 2433 3371 4811 
Ci 659 1149 1491 1903 2575 3595 
All figures are in Euros per month. Group 1 starts at half the minimum wage (around 60% 
of the median income), group 2 at 1.3 time the minimum wage, group the median income, 
group 3 at 1.5 the median and group 5 at twice the median. 
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Table 4: Distribution of Singles between the different income groups (hi) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
Denmark 0.06 0.25 0.20 0.37 0.07 0.06
Finland 0.08 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.11 0.04
France 0.07 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.11 0.10
Germany 0.05 0.24 0.20 0.32 0.13 0.06
Italy 0.09 0.22 0.18 0.27 0.13 0.11
Spain 0.07 0.24 0.18 0.25 0.16 0.10
UK 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.12 0.10  
 
 
 
Table 5: Labor supply elasticity of Singles: a brief review 
 
Country Data Selection Extensive 
elasticity
Intensive 
elasticity
Kleven and Kreiner (2006a, 2006b) Denmark ECHP 97-98 singles 0.35 0.2
Bargain and Orsini (2006) Finland IDS 97 single women 0.18 - 0.33 0.18 - 0.34
Bargain and Orsini (2006) France HBS 95 single women 0.04 - 0.07 0.08 - 0.14
Laroque and Salanie (2001) France Tax revenue 97single women 0.36
Bargain and Orsini (2006) Germany GSOEP 98 single women 0.08 - 0.15 0.09 - 0.18
single women 0.01 - 0.09 0.02 - 0.24
single men 0.06 - 0.19 0.09 - 0.28
single women 0.06 0.10
single men 0.08 0.11
Labeaga, Oliver and Spadaro (2007) Spain ECHP 95 singles 0.2 0.1
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) UK FES 1980 singles 0.24
Haan and Steiner (2005) GSOEP 02
Aaberge et al. (1998) SHIW 1993
Germany
Italy
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Figure 1: Market Income, Taxes, Benefits and Replacement Incomes, as a proportion of disposable incomes 
All households Bottom decile 
 
Top decile  
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Figure 2: Budget Constraints (low-income singles) 
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Figure 3: Change in Gini of Market Income due to Taxes, Benefits Contributions and Replacement 
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Figure 4: The Distribution of Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
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Figure 5: Participation and Unemployment (1998) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
DK FI FR GE IT SP UK
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
(%
)
0
5
10
15
20
25
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
(%
)
employment rate (male) employment rate (female)
unemployment rate (male) unemployment rate (female)
 
 
Figure 6: Social Marginal Weights: Baseline 
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Figure 7: Social Marginal Weights: Sensitivity Analysis 
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Figure 8: Hypothetical Budget Constraint for a Single Mother 
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